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Recent Appellate Court Decisions on
Eyewitness Identification
Jerry E. Norton'
I. Due Process and Suggestive
Identification Procedures
The United States Supreme Court was very
concerned in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the
threat to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments presented by suggestive identification
procedures. In the 1967 case of Stovall v. Denno,
the Supreme Court declared that the Constitution
would be violated where the "confrontation ... was
so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to
irreparable mistaken identification that [the defendant]
was denied due process of law."2 The Court limited
its more expansive reading ofthe broad language in its
earlier decision in 1972 with the case of Neil v.
Biggers.3 In Neil, the Court held that even
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures
would still not violate due process if "under the 'totality
ofthe circumstances' the identification was reliable even
though the confrontation procedure was suggestive."
The Court then listed five factors to consider in
assessing the reliability of the witness' identification:
(1) opportunity to view the perpetrator during the crime;
(2) degree of attention; (3) accuracy of the prior
description; (4) the witness's level of certainty when
identifying the defendant at the time of the
confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the
crime and the confrontation.' Five years later, doubts
concerning the issue of suggestive identification
procedures were resolved in Manson v. Brathwaite.
6 The Court acknowledged "the corrupting effect" of
suggestive identification, but it identified the central due
process concern as being something other than grading
the identification procedures used by the police.' The
Court declared, "reliability is the linchpin in determining
the admissibility of identification testimony."' In the
thirty years since Brathwaite was decided, the
Supreme Court has had little to say ofthe constitutional
restrictions on suggestive identification procedures, in
spite of many psychological studies disclosing
unreliability in eyewitness testimony.
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A. Unnecessarily Suggestive
Identification Procedures in State
Courts
The state courts have not been silent, however. In
the years following the Supreme Court Brathwaite
decision, first New York, then Massachusetts rejected
the due process approaches taken by the Supreme
Court and instead adopted aper se rule in interpreting
their state constitutions. They held that identifications
obtained through the use of unnecessarily suggestive
identification procedures must be excluded, regardless
of indications that the resulting identifications were
reliable.'
New York and Massachusetts were recently joined
by Wisconsin. Last July, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin decided the case of State v. Dubose."o
Judging the admissibility of an identification based on
a one-man showup, the court first reviewed the U.S.
Supreme Court's decisions in Biggers and
Brathwaite. The Wisconsin court concluded, "Studies
have now shown that approach is unsound.. .""
Basing its reasoning on the earlier Supreme Court
decision of Stovall v. Denno,12 the Wisconsin court
adopted the following rule of state constitutional law:
We conclude that evidence
obtained from an out-of-court showup
is inherently suggestive and will not be
admissible unless, based on the totality
of the circumstances, the procedure
was necessary. A showup will not be
necessary, however, unless the police
lacked probable cause to make an
arrest or, as a result of other exigent
circumstances, could not have
conducted a lineup or photo array.II
While the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied that it
was adopting a per se exclusionary rule, it
acknowledged the similarity between its approach to
state constitutional due process and the approaches
taken in New York and Massachusetts.1 4 In these
three states, therefore, unnecessarily suggestive
identification procedures-or at least showup
procedures in the case ofWisconsin-will violate the
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state constitution and cannot be saved by showings of
likely reliability.
B. State Constitutions and the "Level of
Certainty" Factor
Other states have been unwilling to reject the
Biggers-Brathwaite test in toto, but have rejected
the fourth of the five factors listed in Neil v. Biggers,
the one that would permit reliance on the level of
certainty ofthe identifying witness. Many psychological
studies have suggested that the witness' certainty in
his identification of the offender is, in fact, not a strong
indicator ofthe reliability ofthe identification." Arecent
example of the rejection of this factor is a decision of
the Georgia Supreme Court in 2005.16 Georgia had a
pattern jury instruction modeled after the fourth
Biggers factor, telling jurors that they may consider a
witness' level of certainty in his or her identification in
assessing the reliability ofthe identification.'" In Brodes
v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded:
"In the 32 years since the decision in Neil v. Biggers,
the idea that a witness's certainty in his or her
identification of a person as a perpetrator reflected
the witness's accuracy has been 'flatly contradicted
by well-respected and essentially unchallenged
empirical studies.""' While it found the instruction
harmless error in the case before it, the Georgia
Supreme Court directed the state trial courts to
discontinue use ofthe pattem jury instruction.1 9 Courts
in Kansas, Massachusetts and Utah have taken similar
approaches, rejecting the use of "level of certainty"
instructions.2 0 However, the Connecticut Supreme
Court recently decided that their state constitution does
not require that this Biggers factor be abandoned.2 '
C. Corroborating Identifications
The two topics above deal with state courts
interpreting state constitutions. Federal courts, of
course, interpret only the federal constitution and are
bound in this by decisions of the Supreme Court.
However, in applying the totality test in deciding whether
identification is reliable under the standards ofBiggers-
Brathwaite, federal courts, among others, have
Outside the Wisconsin Supreme Court chambers in Madison.
Wisconsin recently joined a handful of other states in
declaring unnecessarily suggestive idenlification procedures
unconstitutional.
frequently required that, where the identification
procedure is unnecessarily suggestive, the identification
must be corroborated in some manner beyond the
testimony ofthe identifying witness.22 As a Tennessee
court put it in State v. Meeks, in addition to the five
Biggers factors, there is a sixth factor not mentioned
by the United States Supreme Court.2 3 That is
"whether an eyewitness identification is supported by
corroborating evidence."2 4 However, there has been
disagreement among the circuits on what the
corroboration must go to. The First, Fourth, Seventh
and Eighth Circuits hold that there must be
corroboration, but that this corroboration satisfies due
process requirements if it corroborates the defendant's
general guilt.25 On the other hand, the Second, Third
and Fifth Circuits hold that corroboration of general
guilt is not enough. There must be corroboration of
the accuracy ofthe identification itself.26 There seems
to be a similar split in state court decisions.2 7
I. Identification Procedures
Courts have rarely ventured into the task of dictating
that particular identification procedures be followed.
A noteworthy exception to this is a decision by the
Connecticut Supreme Court last year holding, in effect,
that whenever there is a risk of misidentification, the
administrator of the identification procedure must
instruct the witness that the perpetrator may or may
(Norton, continued on page 41)
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The Benefits of Socially Supportive
Interviewing for Child Eyewitnesses
Bette L. Bottoms, Ph.D.'
Suspected child abuse victims must give reports to
forensic investigators, such as police officers and social
workers, and sometimes even to judges and jurors.
This raises interesting questions about the accuracy
and believability of children's reports, questions that
can be answered with psychological research. Results
of such research are, in turn, ripe for direct application
to policies and laws.
How accurate is children's eyewitness testimony?
Highly publicized claims that some reports of child
abuse are false highlight the need to ensure that innocent
adults are not being falsely accused of abuse.
Unfortunately, the media have led most people to think
that this is the only reason we should study children's
testimony. False reports are a terrible miscarriage of
justice, but so are undiscovered cases of actual child
abuse. There are around three million reports of child
maltreatment annually in the United States, but that
only scratches the surface. In an anonymous survey
that my students and I conducted with women at the
University of Illinois at Chicago, around 22 percent of
child sexual abuse victims, 39 percent of physical abuse
victims, and 21 percent of emotional abuse victims
reported that they had never told anyone about their
abuse. Of those who did tell someone, fewer than 10
percent disclosed to authorities.' So, much child abuse
goes undisclosed and unreported, and that leaves
children vulnerable to continuing abuse from
unidentified perpetrators. Thus, we should not only
study children's eyewitness testimony to learn what
techniques will guard against false reports, but also to
understand what techniques will help reluctant
witnesses disclose actual abuse. Much research in
psychology has addressed exactly these issues.4
One technique that helps children be more accurate
eyewitnesses is socially supportive interviewing.
Burleson and colleaguess have defined social support
as a form of verbal or non-verbal interaction or
communication that fosters a feeling ofwell-being in
the target. There's good reason to be interested in the
effect of social support on children's eyewitness
reports, because forensic interviews and courtroom
examination can be either socially supportive or
intimidating. On the one hand, clinical intuition has long
held that children should be interviewed in a warm,
supportive manner rather than a more cold, intimidating
way. On the other hand, defense attorneys and some
courts claim that child-friendly interviewing will make
children more willing to please an interviewer and
therefore more suggestible. My colleagues, students
and I have tested these competing predictions in four
experiments.' In each study, we used a basic eyewitness
testimony paradigm used in the now-large literature
investigating children's eyewitness testimony.
Specifically, children experienced a documented non-
abusive event, and then were interviewed immediately
or after a delay. After a non-cued free recall question
("Tell me everything you remember"), we asked
detailed questions, some of which were highly
misleading ("You took your shirt off, didn't you?").
Interviewers were either warm and supportive or non-
supportive (cold) during interviewing, as dictated by
clinical theory and research.
Recent studies show the positive clbets of supportive
iatcrviewiug ft child witnesses including greater accuracy.
Taken as a whole, these studies revealed a number
of interesting things about the effects of interviewer-
provided social support. First, social support increases
the eyewitness accuracy of children ranging in age from
three to eight years. Second, support increases
accuracy in reports of both stressful and non-stressful
events.' Third, social support increases children's
accuracy if interviews are given immediately after the
(Bottoms, continued on page 4)
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original event, as well as if interviews are given after
delays, even a delay of an entire year.9 The nature of
the effect differs, however, as a function of delay. After
delays, but less during immediate interviews, support
improves free recall accuracy. Even after no delay,
however, support reduces children's compliance and
helps them resist misleading questions, thereby
decreasing their suggestibility. Fourth, there are
probably two separate psychological mechanisms for
decreasing suggestibility and increasing free recall
accuracy. That is, the memory-enhancing effects of
social support are likely to be caused by social support
increasing cognitive abilities, such as attentional focus,
and the suggestibility-reducing effects of social support
are probably caused by social support increasing
children's "Resistance Efficacy," or their feelings of
empowerment and confidence about contradicting an
adult's misleading suggestions.'o Fifth, some children
appear to benefit more than others from interviewer-
provided social support, namely those who are: (a)
low in working memory capacity (i.e., generally less
able to attend to tasks without being distracted), (b)
low in social support from other people in his or her
life and (c) insecurely attached (apprehensive and less
trusting of others during social interactions)."
Finally, interviewer-provided social support (and
the lack thereof) can also affect adults'perceptions of
children's credibility.1 2 This is of great practical concem
in a forensic context. If a child makes a disclosure of
abuse, adults must decide whether that disclosure is
credible before any action will be taken to remove a
child from harm or bring a perpetrator to justice. If the
case goes to trial, attorneys, judges, and jurors will
also make judgments about the child's credibility. On
the one hand, adults might be skeptical of supportive
interviewing, wrongly viewing such techniques as
coercive, thinking: "Ifyou are nice to children, they'll
just say whatever they think you want to hear." On the
other hand, adults might intuitively understand the
integrity of supportive techniques, realizing that
intimidation prompts more suggestibility and less
accuracy. Which is it? Adults who watched videotaped
interviews from my prior studies rated children
interviewed in a non-supportive manner as being more
accurate than children who were interviewed in a
SYMPOSIUM ISSUE
supportive manner, when, as described above, the
reverse was true. So, even though socially supportive
interviewing has positive effects on children's actual
accuracy, it might disadvantage child witnesses in terms
of theirperceived credibility.
In conclusion, although there is more work to be
done before we know all the answers, my and others'
research reveals that supportive interviewing carries
no apparent risks and is especially useful for children
with chamcteristics such as high distractibility who might
otherwise be disadvantaged in a forensic interview.
Thus, it should be used widely by forensic interviewers.
Additionally, our research also suggests that courts and
jurors need to be informed of its positive effects.
I Bette L. Bottoms, Ph.D., is Professor of
Psychology at The University of Illinois at Chicago.
She is a Fellow of the American Psychological
Association ("APA") and Past President of the APA
Division of Child, Youth, and Family Services and its
Section on Child Maltreatment. Her research on the
accuracy of children's eyewitness testimony and
jurors' perceptions of children's testimony was
recognized with the APA Saleem Shah Early Career
Award for Contributions to Psychology and Law
Research. She is also the recipient of six teaching
and mentoring awards as well as the Rising Star
Award from the Today's Chicago Woman Foundation
in recognition of her career and community
contributions. She has authored numerous scholarly
articles and edited four books, including Children,
Social Science, and the Law (Cambridge University
Press) and Ending Child Abuse: New Efforts in
Prevention, Investigation and Treatment
(Haworth).
2 D. Finkelhor & L.M. Jones, Sexual abuse decline
in the 1990 ': Evidence for possible Causes,
United States Department of Justice, Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (2004)
(on file with author).
IBette L. Bottoms, Aaron G. Rudnicki & Michael A.
Epstein, A Retrospective Study of Factors Affecting the
Disclosure of Childhood Sexual and Physical Abuse, in
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: DISCLOSURE, DELAY & DENIAL (M.E.
Pipe, M. Lamb, Y. Orbach, & A. C. Cedarborg, eds.,
Erlbaum, forthcoming 2006).
4 MEMORY AND SUGGESTIBILITY IN THE FORENSIC INTERVIEW
(Mitchell E. Eisen, Jodi A. Quas & Gail S. Goodman eds.,
Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc. 2002); ENDING CHILD ABUSE: NEW
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Malpass: fIle illiois Filot Program study shows that
simultaneous lineups lead to more suspect identifications.
Notes on the Illinois Pilot Program on
Sequential Double-Blind Identification
Procedures
Roy S. Malpass'
As a result ofrecommendations made by the Illinois
Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, the
Illinois Legislature charged the Illinois State Police with
conducting a pilot program to evaluate the effectiveness
ofthe sequential, double blind identification procedure
in the field. Sheri H. Mecklenburg was appointed
Director of the Illinois Pilot Program and undertook
to design the Illinois Pilot Program, seeking comments
and approval from eyewitness researchers in the
process. Reporting forms were developed, police
personnel were given training on the new procedures
and procedures were developed for deciding which
lineups would be presented according to traditional or
new procedures. These matters and much more are
detailed in the Report to the Legislature ofthe State
oflllinois: the Bllinois Pilot Program on Sequential
Double-Blind Identification Procedures ("the
Report").2
The author was approached by Mecklenburg,
asking for our participation as analysts. I agreed to act
in this capacity with the assistance of Laura A.
Zimmerman, Stephen J. Ross, Lisa D. Topp, Vanessa
Uribe, Dannette De Leon, Sarah Ramirez and Jessica
Belisle, all members of the Eyewitness Identification
Research Laboratory at the University of Texas at El
5 1 Public Interest Law Reporter
Paso. Periodically we received sets of case reports
from the three participating jurisdictions. We were given
a free hand to structure our analysis in our own way.
We constructed the code book' and implemented an
analysis.4 While we contributed our analysis of the
data, we did not participate in writing the Report. '
Professor Ebbesen of the University of California,
San Diego also agreed to serve as an analyst for the
Pilot Program. Professor Ebbesen and his research
group received the same case reports and constructed
their own way of coding and analyzing the data.
Professor Ebbesen's group and the Eyewitness Lab
at University of Texas at El Paso reached the same
conclusions, although our conventions for coding the
raw field reports for analysis differed in some respects,
leading to somewhat different numbers. Ebbesen and
Malpass never discussed anything about their task -
had no conversation whatever - until they met during
the Symposium held at the Loyola University of Chicago
Law School on April 21, 2006.
Design
The study was designed to determine whether or
not a new eyewitness identification procedure (a
particular variant of double-blind sequential lineup) is
superior to the simultaneous lineup procedure in current
use. The specifics of implementation of the design are
discussed in the Report.6 This study was not the
extension of an academic research program and was
not undertaken to untangle theoretical issues.
Results
The major results are displayed in Table 1, for the
total sample, aggregating the results across the three
jurisdictions. There are three outcomes possible in this
study: suspect identifications, filler identifications and
non-identifications. It is important to note that suspect
identifications cannot be interpreted as either correct
or false identifications, and non-identifications can not
be interpreted as missing the offender or as rejecting a
lineup that does or does not contain the actual offender.
It is not known, for any lineup in this study, whether
the suspect in the lineup is the actual offender. This
can be known in laboratory studies, but not in the field
without a considerable amount of additional research.
We will return to this matter below.
The major results are these:
(Malpass, continued on page 6)
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Table 1. Effects of Simultaneous and Sequential
Lineups on Three Outcome Variables.
n=548 Simultaneous(319) Sequential(229)
Suspect ID 59.9% 45%
Filler ID 2.8% 9.2%
No ID 37.6% 47.2%
* Witnesses who viewed a simultaneous lineup
identified the suspect more often than those
witnesses who viewed a sequential lineup (suspect
identification rates of 59.9 percent and 45 percent
respectively).
* Witnesses who viewed a simultaneous lineup chose
a filler less often than those who viewed a sequential
lineup (filler identification rates of 2.8 percent and
9.2 percent respectively).
* Witnesses who viewed a simultaneous lineup were
less likely to choose no one than were those who
viewed a sequential lineup (no identification rates
of 37.6 percent and 47.2 percent respectively).
As noted above, these results cannot be interpreted
directly as accurate or erroneous responses.
Nonetheless, assuming that the increase in non-
identifications for sequential lineups compared with
simultaneous lineups reflects a proportionate increase
in correct rejections in a culprit-absent lineup, and that
the decrease in suspect identifications from
simultaneous to sequential lineups is proportionate with
a decrease in correct identifications in a culprit-present
lineup, then the sequential advantage for culprit-absent
lineups will be more than offset by the sequential
disadvantage for culprit-present lineups. This
comparison is worsened if one considers that culprit-
present lineups are probably the more frequent. It
seems implausible that on the average law enforcement
does not do better than a .5 probability of getting the
right person in the lineup.
Reasonable people can begin with different
assumptions, however. The proportions of suspect
identifications contributed to correct and false
identifications can be argued, and various probabilities
that the culprit is actually in the lineup can be
entertained.
Stability of the findings across jurisdictions is a
matter of interest from the perspective of application.
These findings are displayed in Table 2.
* For simultaneous lineups, suspect identifications
vary over a range of 10.7 points, from 57.0 to
67.7, and non-identifications vary over a range of
10.1 points, from 32.3 to 42.4.
* For sequential lineups, suspect identifications vary
over a range of 42.7 points, from 25.9 to 68.6,
and non-identifications vary over a range of 34.4
points, from 28.6 to 63.0
* The difference between simultaneous and
sequential lineups also varies considerably, from
+ 41.8 to -7.3.
Sequential lineups appear to be more sensitive to
differences in jurisdiction / location / context /
background conditions, although it is not clear exactly
what conditions these might be.
(Malpass, continued on page 7)
Table 2: Effects of Simultaneous and Sequential Lineups on Three Outcome Variables, by Jurisdiction.
Chicago Evanston Joliet
Sim. Seq. Sim. Seq. Sim. S eq.
Suspect ID 57 43.1 67.7 25.9 61.3 68.6
FillEr ID 0.7 10.2 0 11.1 5.8 2.9
No ID 42.4 48.5 32.3 63 33.6 28.6
SYMPOSIUM MPUTF,
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Discussion and Interpretation
The Illinois Pilot Program' is a landmark eyewitness
identification study, even among field studies:
* The Illinois Pilot Program makes a direct com-
parison between the traditional, intact simulat-
taneous lineup procedures and a version of
double-blind sequential lineups.
* It uses multiple jurisdictions.
* It contains more than 700 individual identific-
ations.
* The criminal cases cover the entire range of
crimes committed during the period of the
study.
Field data are inherently noisy. Field studies are
known for variability, and this is why laboratory studies
are sometimes called "controlled" studies by way of
contrast. There are many investigators, many contexts
and many jurisdictions, and these lead to many
variations in implementation. In some respects the noisy
background may obscure relationships in the data that
might be found under otherwise more controlled
conditions. On the other hand, strong effects showing
through the background variation would be robust.
Additionally, confounding factors outside of the
research design proposed as having an effect on study
outcomes would also have to be strong (substantial
empirical effect size), consistent and detectable to be
taken seriously. Further, the noisy study environment
is a valid reflection of the environment of application
because it IS the environment of application.
It may take some time to frame new questions
arising out of our attempts to interpret these results.
The questions will lead to new and more informative
research - certainly in the laboratory - and hopefully in
field studies carried out in association with law
enforcement. This is a very rich intellectual welfare
program for researchers.
Clearly the problems with eyewitness identifications
have not been solved, and as Barry Scheck pointed
out in his remarks on the eve of the Loyola Conference,
we should move forward to develop other areas of
lineup reform while we clarify the contribution of
sequential lineup presentation. Working relationships
It has to be said that not much good
news will be found in the Illinois Pilot
Program for those who advocate se-
quential lineups to law enforcement
and governmental organizations.
between law enforcement and academic researchers
should be strengthened to study a range of identification
questions.'
Transposition from field categories to the
categories of laboratory studies. An important thing
to note in the interpretive process is that the three
outcome categories of the field study cannot easily
be disaggregated into the six (at least) categories of
laboratory studies.
It would be possible to disaggregate the field study
categories under two conditions: If we make
assumptions about (1) the proportions of each field
category to be distributed to each of the two cognate
lab categories, and (2) the proportion of those figures
to be considered, reflecting the apriori probability of
the suspect being the perpetrator, or not.
Filler Identifications. Filler identifications are the only
responses that have an apparent clear interpretation.
The only thing that can be said, really, is that sequential
lineups attract a non-trivially greater frequency of filler
identifications, overall. This is descriptively true for all
three jurisdictions, but statistically reliable for only two.
The absolute percentage offiller identifications is small.
There does not appear to me to be a theoretically solid
way to use this result to make inferences about the
interpretation of the real interest of this study: the
accuracy of suspect identifications and non-
identifications.
Double-blind simultaneous lineups as a comparison.
The purpose of the study, as stated above, was to
determine whether or not a new eyewitness
identification procedure (a particular variant ofdouble-
(Malpass, continued on page 8)
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